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Abstract
We present evidence that Washington State judges respond to political pressure by
sentencing serious crimes more severely. Sentences are around 10% longer at the end of
a judge’s political cycle than at the beginning; judges’ discretionary departures above
the sentencing guidelines range increase by 50% across the electoral cycle, accounting
for much of the greater severity. Robustness specifications, non-linear models, and fal-
sification exercises allow us to distinguish among explanations for increased sentencing
severity at the end of judges’ political cycles. Our findings inform debates over judicial
elections, and highlight the interaction between judicial discretion and the influence of
judicial elections.
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1 Introduction
Whether judges should be subject to electoral review has long been debated in designing
constitutions and judicial systems1 and has received recent attention in both the legal and
economic literature, as well as in the popular press.2 Editorialists, jurists – notably, retired
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor – and private organizations have expressed
concern that judicial decision making could be influenced by political pressure, to the detri-
ment of the public.3 Researchers have endeavored to determine whether judicial behavior
responds to differences in political environments, part of a large literature examining judges’
responses to the incentives and constraints they face.4 Such work not only informs our
understanding of the judicial branch, but is also relevant to the broader political economy
question of the effect of political pressure and electoral accountability on public servants’
behavior.5
Much of the existing literature on the impact of judicial elections on judges’ behavior has
used cross-state variation in retention methods to identify elections’ effects (for example,
Besley and Payne (2005)). A weakness of this methodology is that differences in retention
methods across states could be correlated with unobservable factors that affect the outcome
of interest.6 Prior work has also generally ignored criminal case outcomes in courts of general
jurisdiction. Work on criminal case outcomes has focused on higher courts (for example,
Hall (1992) and (1995)). Most studies analyzing lower courts have examined civil cases (for
example, Hanssen (1999), Tabarrok and Helland (1999), and Besley and Payne (2005)).
One might prefer to focus on criminal case outcomes in lower courts for several reasons.
First, the stakes are high: depending on the outcome of a criminal case, the state may
deprive a citizen of his rights, property and even his life. Because courts of appeals give
considerable deference to the findings of facts by trial courts and, in states with determinate
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sentencing, convicted felons serve their full sentences, trial court outcomes are paramount.
Second, crime is an issue about which the citizenry has well defined preferences. In addition,
since convicted felons lose their right to vote in most states (including Washington, see RCW
9.94A.637), they could be an attractive target for politically opportunistic judges.
Several recent papers have focused on the impact of politics on criminal case sentencing. Lim
(2008) estimates a structural model of felony sentencing by Kansas judges and finds that
judges in counties using partisan judicial elections exhibit different sentencing patterns from
judges in counties using referendum judicial elections. These different patterns are attributed
both to different preferences and to the effects of elections on judges’ behavior. Gordon and
Huber (2004) and (2007) estimate the effect of the proximity of a judge’s retention election on
that judge’s sentencing decisions using data from Pennsylvania and Kansas. In Pennsylvania,
where judges are retained in referendum elections, they find that sentencing becomes more
severe as elections approach (that is, sentencing severity exhibits “cycles” corresponding to
the political calendar); however, they do not find sentencing cycles in Kansas counties where
judges are so retained. Gordon and Huber do find sentencing cycles in Kansas counties where
judges are retained in partisan elections.
We also examine the impact of elections on judicial behavior by testing for the presence of
political sentencing cycles. Under a broad range of specifications, we find that sentencing
of serious offenses becomes more severe as elections approach – sentence lengths increase by
around 10% between the beginning and the end of a judge’s political cycle. In contrast to
much of the existing literature, we are able to test – and rule out – alternatives to the hy-
pothesis that longer sentences are the effect of political pressure on judges. First, we directly
examine case characteristics (including variables that reflect the result of any bargaining
between the defense and district attorneys) across judges’ political cycles, and do not find
evidence that these systematically vary across the judge’s political cycle. A range of specifi-
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cations suggests that changes in the behavior of defense and district attorneys across judges’
political cycles do not explain the sentencing cycles we observe. We distinguish between
judicial political cycles and the political cycles of other officials by exploiting differences in
the timing of electoral pressure across offices, and exploring non-linear models of the effect
of electoral proximity. We find that sentence lengths exhibit a break precisely at the end of
judges’ political cycles, but not at the end of the political cycles of other officials. We can
rule out cyclical patterns in sentencing due to factors other than politics (e.g., variation in
unobservable case characteristics) by examining sentencing by retiring judges, who do not
face electoral pressure; the sentencing of less serious crimes, about which the public (and
potential competitors for a judge’s seat) are likely less concerned; and, sentencing in nearby
Oregon, where judges are elected on a different cycle. We do not find sentencing cycles
for retiring judges in their final term, or cycles for less serious crimes; sentencing in nearby
Oregon does not follow the Washington pattern. All of this analysis provides evidence of
large and statistically significant sentencing differences in judges’ sentencing behavior in re-
sponse to political pressure. To better understand the nature of these sentencing cycles, we
consider multiple outcome variables, shedding light on the role played by deviations outside
the sentencing guidelines range. We find that deviations above the range increase by 50%
across a judge’s political cycle and account for a large part of the cycles in sentence length,
suggesting that the effect of political pressure on sentencing is mediated by the availability
of judicial discretion.
In what follows, we discuss judicial elections and criminal sentencing in the state of Wash-
ington in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe and provide empirical support for a theoretical
framework that predicts sentencing cycles as a result of political pressure on judges. In Sec-
tion 4, we discuss our data and the construction of the variables used in our analysis. We
present our empirical model and results in Section 5, and finally discuss the implications of
our findings and conclude in Section 6.
4
2 Judicial Elections and Criminal Sentencing in Wash-
ington
The structure of judicial elections and the laws governing sentencing provide the context for,
and inform, our empirical analysis of judges’ behavior.
2.1 Judicial Elections
Washington Superior Courts are currently organized into 32 judicial districts, either a county,
or a group of adjacent counties,7 and Superior Court judges are elected and retained via
nonpartisan elections every four years (coinciding with presidential election years).8 Judicial
candidates are required to file for public office by the filing deadline – in our sample period
the last Friday of July – and if more than one candidate files for a given seat, the candidates
face each other in the primary elections (held in September). If no candidate receives more
than 50% of the vote in the primary election, the two candidates with the most votes face
each other in the general election (held in November).
For our purposes, judges’ political cycles end either at the filing deadline, after which the
threat of a challenger in the upcoming election no longer exists, or at the primary or general
election, depending on the entry and success of challengers.
2.2 Criminal Sentencing
Criminal sentencing in Washington for felony crimes is governed by the 1981 Washington
Sentencing Reform Act (WSRA), which established presumptive sentencing ranges based on
the conviction offense and the defendant’s criminal history.9 The Washington guidelines are
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relatively simple and transparent, especially in cases that are adjudicated via plea agreements
(the vast majority of Washington cases), as the plea agreement itself includes the guidelines
cell, including any enhancements (the relevant page from the Washington plea agreement
form is in the Online Appendix, Figure A2).
For each case, then, the applicable range of the sentencing guidelines cell can be thought
of as the basic constraints on judicial discretion, which the judge takes as given.10 In our
baseline empirical analysis, we will consider the use of judicial discretion controlling for the
guidelines range that applies to a given case, as well as a dummy variable indicating the type
of adjudication (plea or trial). This specification allows us to isolate the variation in sentence
severity due to changes in judges’ behavior across their political cycles: by conditioning on
the outcomes of attorneys’ bargains, we hope to remove any effect of changed outcomes of
attorneys’ bargains from the relationship we estimate between political pressure on the judge
and sentence severity.
Of course, plea agreements and guidelines cells are negotiated by attorneys in the shadow of
the trial judge (see, for example, Reinganum (1988), Lacasse and Payne (1999), and Bibas
(2004)), and thus might endogenously respond to changes in political pressure on the judge.
To address this concern with our baseline empirical model, in our empirical analysis below we
also examine the shifting of cases across adjudication categories, across sentencing guidelines
cells, and across time.
Prior to the Blakely decision of 2004,11 Washington Superior Court judges had full discretion
to select a sentence within the applicable range, and could sentence outside the standard
range upon making certain findings (see RCW 9.94A.390). In practice, deviations outside
the range were quite unusual: in our sample of felony convictions, judges imposed sentences
above the range in fewer than 3% of cases (and in 6% of the serious crimes on which we focus).
If the judge found that an exceptional sentence was warranted, the sentence length was left to
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his discretion, but was subject to appellate review. After Blakely, a judge may still sentence
anywhere within the applicable range in the sentencing grid, but cannot impose a sentence
above this range unless the jury finds, or the defendant pleads to, special circumstances
prescribed by statute.
Under the WSRA, an individual convicted of a felony offense occurring on or after July
1, 1984, receives a determinate sentence and, as a result, is expected to serve the sentence
in full. This is important since the existence of a parole board that conditions the release
dates of convicted felons on recidivism risk could mitigate any social welfare consequences
of excessive sentences.12
3 Theoretical Framework
There exists a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, on political cycles among
executive and legislative government officials (for example, Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff and
Sibert (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992), and Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)); for
a recent overview of empirical evidence, see Franzese (2002). In these models, there is a
principal-agent problem with moral hazard: officials are voters’ agents, and voters reward
performance in office with their votes because they attribute good performance either to the
incumbent’s ability or to his willingness to further the electorate’s interest rather than his
own. If voters or potential challengers (who can inform voters) monitor and evaluate officials
around the time of an election, there will exist incentives for the incumbent to perform well
(i.e., perform as voters prefer) precisely at this time. Cyclical behavior across an official’s
term can also arise from time discounting: early in their terms, officials will behave according
to their own preferences, while late in their terms they will place more weight on maintaining
their official positions, and thus behave according to voters’ preferences.13
7
Elected judges in Washington State face political pressure similar to that faced by other
elected officials. They are voters’ agents, and there exists a divergence between voters’
preferences and judges’: voters prefer more severe penalties than judges hand down. We
review the General Social Surveys (GSS) from 1972–200614 and find that when asked whether
“the courts in [the respondent’s] area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?,”
82.8% of the respondents answered that courts are “not harsh enough”, while only 12.2%
and 5.1% believed that courts were “about right” or “too harsh”, respectively.15 These
differences in sentencing preferences may arise from various factors. First, judges do not like
being reversed, and they can be reversed in a criminal case if their judgment results in a
conviction, or (in Washington State) if the sentence they impose is higher than the high-end
of the applicable guidelines range. Second, the public may have a biased perception of the
average criminal (or crime), for example, as a result of the portrayal of crime in the media.
Third, the judge has to personally confront the person who is being sentenced, which may
make extremely punitive sentencing more costly. Finally, judges are, on average, better
educated than voters, and may be systematically different in other ways (culturally, socially,
politically), which could lead them to prefer more lenient sentences. Regardless of the reason
for the divergence in preferences, there is good reason to believe that judges might sentence
more severely in order to please voters.
Of course, judges will only change their behavior in response to political pressure if there
is some possibility that voters will punish them for sentencing too leniently. For voters to
do so, they must vote in judicial elections, and they must have access to information on
judges’ sentencing. To explore the issue of turnout, we collected voting data for two counties
(King and Yakima) in the 2004 judicial election cycle. In Yakima County, voter turnout for
the Superior Court race during the 2004 General Elections was 9% higher than the turnout
for the three Supreme Court races and 90% of the turnout for the gubernatorial election.
During the 2004 primaries, voter turnout for the Superior Court race was 11% higher than
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the turnout for the three Supreme Court races and 93% of the turnout for the gubernatorial
primaries.16 In King County, voter turnout for the two Superior Court races during the 2004
General Elections was 95% of the turnout for the three Supreme Court races and 73% of the
turnout for the gubernatorial election. During the 2004 primaries there were three contested
seats and voter turnout for these races was 98% of the turnout for four Supreme Court
races and 70% of the turnout for the gubernatorial primaries.17 Although these numbers are
anecdotal, they suggest that the public does vote in Superior Court elections.
The next question is whether voters have information on judges’ sentencing behavior. A
natural monitor of judicial behavior, and potential source of such information to the elec-
torate, is the media. Using Lexis-Nexis, we search major Washington newspapers18 to assess
the frequency of stories involving Superior Court judges; and, to provide some perspective,
we compare it to the frequency of news stories involving other elected city officials.19 For
the period July 1995–December 2006, there were 13,404 stories involving Superior Court
judges compared to 14,434 involving city council members.20 Of the 13,404 stories involving
Superior Court judges, 4,603 also involve sentencing.21
Importantly, newspapers focus on the serious crimes about which the public is likely most
concerned: those classified by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) as violent
crimes, namely murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated assault. Out of the 4,603 stories involving sentencing by Superior Court judges, 3,671
(79.75%) involve at least one of the four crimes labeled as violent by the UCR.22 These
results support our use of the UCR-inspired set of visible crimes as the subset of crimes on
which we focus our empirical work.
Potential challengers have an incentive both to monitor incumbents’ current behavior and to
research their past behavior; and, when they officially challenge an incumbent, challengers
have the incentive to provide this information to the public. In their study of print media
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and judicial elections in Wisconsin, Kearney and Eisenberg (2002) find that in state Circuit
Court (analogous to Washington’s Superior Court) races, advertising by judicial candidates
dominates newspaper articles as a means of disseminating information about judicial candi-
dates. In addition, the authors find that advertisements often touch upon criminal matters.
We have reviewed Washington judicial candidates’ websites and voter pamphlets (from the
2008 election cycle) and find that crime and sentencing are among the issues discussed by
challengers.23
One might wonder whether the threat of competition can keep judges’ behavior consistently
in line with voters’ preferences (resulting in no cyclicality in sentence severity). There are
several reasons why incumbent judges may tend to sentence leniently early in their terms and
more severely toward the end, despite the threat of competition. First, if monitoring a judge’s
sentencing is costly, potential challengers might only do so when they are considering entering
a race – which occurs late in a judge’s term. Because researching past sentencing is costly
for a challenger, they will likely invest more effort in observing current judge sentencing,
making it less costly for a judge to behave as he likes early in his term. Second, even if a
potential challenger informs voters of a lenient sentence from a judge’s past, this information
may influence voters less than information on more recent sentences – again, this would lead
a judge to sentence relatively leniently early in his term. Finally, to the extent that the judge
discounts the future, this would only make more pronounced his tendency to sentence severely
only at the end of his term. Thus, we expect incumbent judges will sentence most severely
close to the deadline for competitors to file to enter a race: this is when incumbents are most
likely to be monitored, and when they place the greatest weight on voters’ preferences.
Thus, just as executive or legislative officials are incentivized to lower taxes or increase public
spending before their elections to avoid being punished in the polls, judges face analogous
pressure to impose longer sentences as they near the end of their political cycles. We next
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test whether they respond to this pressure by sentencing more severely.
4 Data and Construction of Variables
4.1 Description of the Dataset
We obtained case-level data from the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission
(“SGC”) on criminal sentencing in felony cases. The dataset includes 294,349 observations
from the period July 1995 through December 2006. The data include information on case-
specific variables such as defendant characteristics (for example, race, criminal history, etc.),
date of sentence, name of judge, conviction offense, low- and high-end of the applicable
sentencing guidelines range (including enhancements), type of adjudication (plea or trial),
and sentence length, for the most serious conviction offense (among other variables). We
augment the data received from the SGC with information on judges, judicial districts, and
judicial elections, as described below.
We restrict the sample of cases used in our analysis in several ways. We only include cases
heard by judges serving in the Superior Court, the court of general jurisdiction for criminal
cases. Cases heard by judges who were serving on the Superior Court as commissioners, in
a pro tem capacity, or who were serving as District Court judges at the date of sentence, are
excluded from our sample. Each Superior Court judge is matched to one of Washington’s
judicial districts, and we exclude cases heard by a judge outside his home district (judges
may appear in multiple districts either because of measurement error or because they are
acting as “visiting” judges in a neighboring district). We also exclude cases heard by judges
with fewer than 25 cases in the sample, cases heard by judges appointed to fill a mid-term
vacancy prior to their first election, and cases in which the judge has no sentencing discretion.
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We also classify crimes according to classes based on two-digit offense codes (provided by
the SGC), and restrict our analysis to those felony classes for which there were at least 100
cases.
After applying these restrictions, there remain 276,119 cases heard by 265 full-time Superior
Court judges for the period between July 1995 and December 2006 (the Online Appendix,
Table A1, contains case-level summary statistics for this sample). Our empirical analysis
will focus on the most serious, visible crimes (as defined by the FBI, described in Section 3):
assault, murder, rape and robbery, which make up 6.7% of the entire sample (18,447 cases).
Among these visible crimes, 8% of defendants are women and 24% are black; around 53%
have at least one prior conviction; the vast majority of cases are resolved via plea agreement
(over 88%). The average case is associated with a 51 month low-range sentence from the
sentencing guidelines grid, and a 67.6 month high-range; the average sentence is 67.2 months.
Around 6.3% of cases result in sentences greater than the high-end of the guidelines range.
On average, cases are heard almost exactly halfway into a judge’s election cycle (see Table
1 for case-level summary statistics).
Of the 265 judges in our dataset, 29% are women and 5% are Black; judges on average were
admitted to the Washington Bar in 1974 and took their seats on the Superior Court in 1992.
36% of judges had some prior experience as prosecuting attorneys; 46% had previous judicial
experience. In the time period on which we focus (1995–2006), we observe 456 seated judges
filing for re-election. Of these judges, 39 (8.4%) faced competition in a primary election,
and 4 (.87%) faced competition through a general election (the Online Appendix, Table A2,
contains summary statistics for the 265 judges).
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4.2 Construction of Variables
We examine several different sentencing outcomes in our analysis. Our primary measure
of sentence severity is the length of a prison or jail sentence in months, top-coded at 720
months (following Abrams et al. (2008)). We also consider sentence lengths with a top-code
of 1,200 months; in some specifications we censor sentence length at the high- and low-end
of the applicable sentencing range. Finally, we consider a binary outcome variable equal to
one if a judge imposed a sentence above the high-end of the guidelines’ range for a case.
The explanatory variable of interest is the electoral pressure on a case’s judge, in particular,
the proximity of the judge’s next election or filing deadline (information on which was com-
piled from the Washington Secretary of State’s website, various county auditor websites, and
county election websites). We construct both linear and nonlinear measures of electoral prox-
imity. The linear measure of electoral proximity is, in general, for case i, heard by judge j,
sentenced at time t, the number of days between time t and the next election’s filing deadline
for judge j, divided by 1,461 (the number of days in four years, a full election cycle).24 This
measure, which we call linear distance, ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 implying maximal elec-
toral pressure. When a judge faces a competitor for his seat, we set our proximity measure
equal to 0 for any cases sentenced between the filing deadline and the date that an election
determines the winner of the seat. Based on this linear measure of electoral proximity, we
construct a set of dummy variables that indicate the number of quarters remaining until a
judge’s upcoming filing deadline, ranging from one to sixteen (with any cases between the
filing deadline and the end of that judge’s election cycle included in the 1-quarter-to-election
period).
Case-specific controls include defendant’s age, gender, race, and prior criminal history; an
indicator of whether the sentence resulted from a plea agreement; a set of offense-specific
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indicator variables; and, the applicable sentencing guidelines range for each case. Addition-
ally, we construct a set of fixed effects for the cell in the Washington Sentencing Guidelines
Grid in which a case is located. The cells are constructed based on the high- and low-end
of the sentencing guidelines range, including all enhancements. In order to avoid estimates
based on cells with very few cases, we consider a variety of methods of grouping cases that
are in the most unusual cells, grouping them 100, 150, or 200 at a time.
To control for changes in sentencing behavior resulting from the Blakely decision, we generate
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the case’s sentence date was after June 24, 2004. We also
generate a set of year-specific fixed effects to capture shocks affecting criminal sentencing
that are common to all judges in a given year, and a set of fixed effects for each quarter of the
year (January through March, April through June, etc.), which control for any seasonality
in judges’ sentencing behavior.
A set of judge fixed effects controls for differences in sentencing across judges and a set of
judicial district fixed effects controls for time-invariant features of a district (for example,
stable differences in the various district attorneys’ offices). We also collected information on
time-variant judicial district characteristics: unemployment rates and crime rates (see the
Online Appendix, Table A3, for a detailed description of the names, definitions, and sources
of all variables used in our empirical analysis).
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5 Empirical Model and Results
5.1 Empirical Model and Identifying Assumptions
As described above, we constructed a dataset by merging case-level information provided by
the SGC to information on districts and judges compiled from a variety of sources. The unit
of observation in our dataset is the case, i, heard by judge j, sentenced at time t. Each case
is associated with a specific offense, defendant, judge, sentence date, and sentence.
Our empirical model is the following:
severityijt = F (t) + β1Proxijt + β2Zijt + ǫijt (1)
where, severityijt is a sentencing outcome associated with case i ; F(t) includes a set of
year and quarter fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether case i was
decided after the Blakely decision; Proxijt, our explanatory variable of interest, is a measure
of electoral proximity (linear or nonlinear); Zijt contains a set of defendant, crime, and
sentencing guidelines controls, as well as a full set of judge and judicial district fixed effects;
finally, ǫijt is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
This baseline empirical specification goes beyond just examining the reduced form relation-
ship between judicial elections’ proximity and sentencing (though this reduced form rela-
tionship is in itself interesting). It incorporates various aspects of the structure and timing
of judicial procedure in Washington State in order to try to identify changes in judges’ be-
havior per se. In particular, two crucial outcomes of attorneys’ actions – whether a case is
adjudicated via plea or trial, and the sentencing guidelines cell in which a case falls – are
determined prior to a judge’s sentencing decision, and are observed in our dataset. In the
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baseline analysis, we control for variation in the type of adjudication and the sentencing
guidelines cell in which each case fell, thus “purging” from the estimated effect of electoral
proximity that part which works through attorneys’ bargaining. Under the identifying as-
sumptions that cases are randomly assigned across the judge’s political cycle (conditional
on controls) and that the attorneys’ negotiation process does not change across the judge’s
political cycle – both assumptions that we examine in detail – this specification allows us
to estimate the effect of judicial elections’ proximity working through changes in a judge’s
sentencing, conditional on the outcomes of attorneys’ negotiations.
Before presenting our baseline empirical results, it is important first to consider the fun-
damental identifying assumptions that need to be satisfied for our estimate of β1 to be an
unbiased estimate of the impact of judicial elections’ proximity on the sentences that judges
impose. We begin by examining whether cases are randomly assigned across the political
cycle, conditional on the control variables included in the model. Next, we will take up the
issue of endogenous outcomes of attorney negotiations (and we return to both of these issues
again in Section 5.3).
In practice, an important concern is that aspects of a case that we cannot observe (some
characteristics of the crime, of the criminal, etc.), and that affect sentencing, are changing
over time in a way that is correlated with our measure of electoral proximity. This might
arise from the strategic behavior of attorneys or the judge, or might be due to other sources
of variation from outside the judicial system (e.g., changes in policing). While we cannot
directly test for systematic variation in unobservable characteristics across the political cycle,
we attempt to address this issue as rigorously as possible.
We begin by simply examining observable case characteristics just before (and during) the
judicial election period, and compare them to cases just after the judicial elections. If
observables are balanced across the political cycle, one might believe that unobservables are
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balanced, too. In Table 2, columns 1–2, we present summary statistics for serious, visible
crime cases sentenced in the two quarters before a judge’s filing deadline (and up to his
election, when applicable), as well as the analogous statistics in the two quarters after a
judge’s filing deadline or election (see the Online Appendix, Table A4, for a comparison of
case characteristics around the filing deadline for all crimes). Importantly, visible crimes
make up a similar proportion of all cases before and after elections, around 6.9%. For the
serious, visible crimes, both defendant and case characteristics look very similar just before
and just after judicial elections (p-values testing for equality of means are reported in column
3). Women make up around 8.5% of the sample in both periods; black defendants around
25%; around 51% of defendants have at least one prior conviction. Most of the data in Table
2, columns 1–3, are consistent with random assignment of cases across judges’ political cycles.
Some case characteristics do differ across periods. The most important of these is the frac-
tion of cases adjudicated by plea agreement: 87.7% just before elections and 89.2 just after
elections, a marginally significant difference. This difference immediately raises the ques-
tion of endogenous attorney negotiation across judges’ political cycles. It is reassuring to
see that the high-and low-end of the sentencing guidelines range reveal no significant differ-
ences in Table 2 (this suggests that neither judges nor attorneys successfully manipulate the
sentencing guidelines range), but we must examine attorneys’ bargains in greater depth.
Pleas might differ across the political cycle simply because of natural variation in case char-
acteristics; in that case, we would simply want to control for whether a case resulted in a plea
or trial. On the other hand, the changing rate of plea agreements might systematically alter
the types of cases ending in plea agreement across judges’ political cycles. To see whether
the difference in plea agreements seems to shift the types of cases in a given category, we
check for balanced characteristics within adjudication categories across the election cycle.
In Table 2, columns 4–9, we present summary statistics just before and just after elections,
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along with tests for equality of means, for pleas alone and for trials alone. In both cases, one
can see that observable case characteristics are quite balanced across the election cycle: for
example, it is not the case that pleas just before and after the cycle end up with significantly
different sentencing guidelines ranges.
To examine the potential endogeneity of pleas and sentencing guidelines range outcomes
more systematically, we regress these outcomes on linear distance (our explanatory variable
of interest in the baseline model), as well as year and quarter-of-the-year fixed effects (which
control for changes in case characteristics across time). In all three regressions, the outcomes
of attorney negotiations are not significantly associated with our measure of political pressure
on the judge: p-values testing for a significant relationship range from 0.28 to 0.76. We also
examined whether these outcomes were systematically different in the last six months of
the judge’s political cycle (relative to the rest of the cycle), regressing the three negotiation
outcomes on a dummy indicating that a case was sentenced in the last 6 months of a judge’s
political cycle, year fixed effects, and quarter-of-the-year fixed effects. Again, p-values testing
for a significant relationship between the political cycle and attorneys’ negotiations are quite
high: between 0.24 and 0.65. Finally, we ran 115 regressions with an indicator for each
sentencing guidelines cell as the outcome, and an indicator that a case was sentenced in
the last six months of the political cycle as the explanatory variable of interest (using our
baseline specification). In only five of these is the coefficient on the “last six months”
indicator significant – cells are distributed essentially randomly across the political cycle.25
We will return to concerns about endogenous attorney bargains in Section 5.3.1, and take
up more general concerns about unobservables correlated with judges’ political cycles in
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. For now, given the reassuring evidence on the distribution of cases
and attorneys’ negotiations across judges’ political cycles, we will estimate our baseline
specification, controlling for the type of adjudication and the guidelines cells.
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5.2 Baseline Results and Sensitivity Analysis
We begin our examination of sentence severity across judges’ political cycles by presenting
the sentencing patterns for serious, visible crimes in the raw data. We simply plot the average
difference between the sentence length and the high-end of the applicable guidelines range,
by the number of quarters remaining until the next election or filing deadline (see Figure 1).
In this graph, one observes an increase in sentence length from the beginning of the political
cycle to the end, and a sharp decline in the severity of sentences just after the cycle ends. In
addition, sentences in the final year of the political cycle are, on average, above the high-end
of the guidelines range; this is almost never the case during the first three years of the cycle.
To examine this relationship more rigorously, we estimate equation (1) for visible crimes using
a linear measure of electoral proximity (linear distance) and a full set of control variables,
and using the sentence length in months, capped at 720 months, as our outcome variable.
This specification covers three judicial elections: 1996, 2000, and 2004. If judges sentence
more harshly as their elections approach, one would expect distance to the election to be
negatively correlated with sentence length; and, as can be seen in Table 3, column 1, this
is exactly what we find. We estimate that moving from the beginning of a judge’s election
cycle to the end adds a statistically significant 6.8 months to a defendant’s sentence.26 This
represents over 10% of the average sentence for visible crimes in our sample.27
We next check the robustness of our results to the cases included in our empirical analysis.
One may be concerned that the Blakely decision, which significantly reduced judicial discre-
tion, may confound our estimates. To address this, we estimate equation (1) as above using
only cases decided pre-Blakely (see Table 3, column 2). One might worry that murder cases
are driving our results: because murder convictions will often produce very long sentences,
including murder cases might allow outlying sentences to have undue influence.28 We thus
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estimate equation (1) only for visible crimes other than murder (see Table 3, column 3).
Finally, we estimate equation (1) only on cases adjudicated by plea agreement (see Table
3, column 4). In all three of these specifications, our estimated coefficient is negative, sta-
tistically significant, and large. Even for cases adjudicated by plea agreements, where one
might expect judicial discretion to be more limited, the estimated coefficient is over 6% of
the mean sentence for visible crimes.29
It is also important to evaluate the robustness of our results to the specification choices
that we made. One concern is that our measure of electoral proximity is endogenous: if
severe sentences make it less likely that an incumbent judge will face a challenger, then
our proximity measure will be endogenous. Thus, we estimate our baseline specification
using a purely exogenous measure of linear distance which only uses the time until the next
filing deadline to measure electoral proximity (see Table 3, column 5).30 Another issue is
our method of controlling for the guidelines range relevant to each case. In our baseline
estimates (Table 3, column 1), we used cells constructed based on the low- and high-end
of the range for each crime; and, for crimes in cells with fewer than 150 cases, we grouped
crimes, 150 at a time, based on similarity of the low-end of the range for each crime.31 One
might be concerned about grouping crimes with different low- and high-end ranges. To see
whether this grouping of crimes affects our results, we use only cases in cells that contain
50 or more observations, dropping cases in the most unusual cells instead of grouping them
(see Table 3, column 6). To determine whether our results depend on the use of any sort of
cells as controls, we consider estimates that simply control linearly for the low-end and the
high-end of the sentencing range applicable to the case (see Table 3, column 7). Under all
of these alternative specifications, we find significant and large sentencing cycles of around
10% of the average sentence length in the relevant sample.
Next, we estimate equation (1) on an extended dataset, covering the period 1985–2006,
20
which includes five judicial elections.32 This dataset, also provided to us by the Washington
SGC, does not have as much information as our 1995–2006 dataset; in particular, it lacks
information on each case’s judge. Thus, we simply assign each case a linear electoral prox-
imity measure based on the upcoming election’s filing deadline. The estimates using these
data will be imperfect, but they should reassure the reader that our estimates in Table 3,
columns 1–7 were not the product of too few election cycles. These results are also based on
an entirely exogenous measure of electoral pressure, as they do not incorporate information
on competition. We thus estimate equation (1) using the entire 1985–2006 time period, and
again find a statistically significant, negative, and large coefficient on linear distance (see
Table 3, column 8).33
Finally, we use the log of the sentence length (plus 1) as the outcome in our regression, as this
has been standard in the empirical literature on sentencing. We prefer the levels specification
since adding 1 to the sentence length to avoid dropping sentences of length 0 is arbitrary; in
addition, the log transformation of the outcome variable reduces the variation from which
we identify the effect of electoral proximity, especially for longer sentences. Nonetheless, we
observe statistically significant sentencing cycles in this specification as well (see Table 3,
column 9).34
We report several other robustness checks in the Online Appendix. First, because we include
many fixed effects in our baseline specification, we estimate equation (1), but use judge
characteristics instead of judge fixed effects. To test the sensitivity of our results to the
choice of 720 months as a top-code for our outcome variable, we estimate equation (1), but
use the sentence length in months capped at 1,200 months as our outcome variable. Our
baseline results are robust to all of these specification choices (see the Online Appendix,
Table A6, columns 3–5).
The results presented in Table 3 are striking: essentially the same defendant (based on
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observable characteristics), having committed the same crime, facing the same judge, with
his case ending in the same sentencing guidelines cell, receives a significantly longer prison
sentence if he is sentenced at the end of the judge’s political cycle rather than the beginning.
This result is robust to a wide range of different specification choices, the exclusion of murder,
and the construction of guidelines cells. It is also robust to examining the five judicial
elections between 1985 and 2006.
5.3 Ruling out Alternative Hypotheses
The results presented thus far strongly suggest that greater electoral proximity for a case’s
judge is associated with a longer sentence for that case. However, one could conceive of
explanations for the relationship observed other than judges responding to political pressure.
Here we evaluate several alternative explanations for our results: first, we consider changes
in the behavior of the defense attorney and the prosecutor; next, we consider the effects of
the political cycles of officials other than judges; finally, we consider changes in unobservable
case characteristics across judges’ political cycles more generally.
5.3.1 Does Attorneys’ Behavior Change Across Judges’ Political Cycles?
In our baseline estimates, we attempted to identify judges’ (as opposed to attorneys’) re-
sponse to political pressure by controlling for the outcomes of attorneys’ negotiations. We
now explore changes in attorney behavior across judges’ political cycles in more depth. We
consider, in turn, the changing rate of plea agreements across judges’ political cycles (also
discussed in Section 5.1); the roles of changing plea agreement practices and sentencing
guidelines cells in generating sentencing cycles; and, finally, the shifting of cases across time
by attorneys (or judges).
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Our results in Table 2 raised some concerns about differences in the types of plea agreements
reached across judges’ political cycles. Moreover, Piehl and Bushway (2007) find that charge
bargaining and prosecutorial discretion in negotiating pleas are important in Washington.
If the bargains struck varied across judges’ political cycles – perhaps because attorneys
understood that judges’ incentives differed – this could affect both the rate of pleas across
the cycle, and also the types of cases in each adjudication category. For example, if cases
with “worse” unobservable characteristics were adjudicated by plea toward the end of judges’
political cycles, simply controlling for the adjudication type would not be enough. One
might worry that the association between judicial elections’ proximity and sentence severity
observed in our baseline specification resulted from mis-specifying the effect of the type of
adjudication on sentence length. To address this concern, we estimate our baseline model,
but now include an interaction between the type of adjudication (a “trial” dummy variable)
and linear distance. The coefficient on linear distance here captures the impact of elections’
proximity on sentencing for pleas, which will allow for a comparison with the “pleas only”
specification presented in Table 3, column 4.35 As can be seen in Table 4, column 1, we find
a statistically significant coefficient on linear distance of approximately the same magnitude
as in our “only pleas” specification.36 This suggests that controlling for a fixed effect of the
type of adjudication did not drive our results.
We next estimate the effect of judicial elections’ proximity on sentencing as in our baseline
model, but excluding the potentially endogenous type of adjudication and sentencing guide-
lines controls. If attorneys’ bargaining played a large role in generating longer sentences
at the end of judges’ political cycles, one would expect a large change in the coefficient on
linear distance when we do not control for these bargains. Similarly, if the unobservable
characteristics of cases in particular cells differed across judges’ political cycles, and our
baseline estimates were driven by mistaken comparisons of different types of cases in the
same cell, then omitting these controls should change our results. In fact, the estimated
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effect of elections’ proximity is very similar in these specifications to our baseline (compare
Table 4, column 2, to Table 3, column 1). This result suggests that neither changed attorney
bargains, nor varying case characteristics within a guidelines cell or adjudication category
across the judge’s political cycle, plays a large role in the cyclical sentencing pattern we
observe.
Finally, case shifting across time – by attorneys or by the judge – is certainly a concern. How-
ever, shifting cases would likely generate unbalanced observable case characteristics across
the political cycle, which we do not generally observe (see Table 2). Case shifting would also
likely generate significant differences across the political cycle in the time between charge and
sentence. We have data on the time between charge and sentence for two-thirds of our cases.
In results we omit for brevity, we run this “time-to-sentence” variable as the outcome in our
main specification, and the point estimate suggests that it takes five days longer for a case to
be sentenced at the end of the cycle than at the beginning: testing the significance of linear
distance yields a p-value of 0.81. Furthermore, case shifting based on case characteristics
unobservable to us should generate systematic differences not just at the end of the cycle
(when we observe longer sentences), but also just after the political cycle ends. If attorneys
or judges delayed cases with unobservable characteristics associated with lenient sentences
until after the end of the political cycle, one would expect the first quarter after the election
(or filing deadline) to have significantly more lenient sentences than quarters thereafter. We
do not observe any such significant differences: if we estimate equation (1) using a set of
quarter-to-election dummies as our measure of judicial elections’ proximity, we observe very
severe sentences at the end of judges’ political cycles, but there are no significant differences
among dummies for 16-, 15-, and 14-quarters-to-election (see Figure 2).37
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5.3.2 Other Political Cycles
Another possible alternative to the hypothesis that judges respond to electoral pressure is
that judges’ electoral cycles coincide with some other political cycle, which is in fact driving
the sentencing differences we observe. For example, Levitt (1997) finds that there are cycles
in the hiring of police officers associated with the elections of mayors and governors. This
might produce spurious sentencing cycles by changing the composition of cases or affecting
judges’ preferences. One might also be concerned if district attorneys’ or the attorney gen-
eral’s political cycles corresponded with those of judges, because changes in these officials’
behavior might affect plea bargains and sentencing.38
Fortunately, we can make a strong case that our results are not being driven by non-judicial
political cycles. First, the elections of mayors in Washington take place on odd-numbered
years, so mayors’ political cycles do not correspond with judges’ (RCW 29A.04.330 and RCW
2.08.060). Second, district attorneys in Washington run on the “off-year” election cycle (that
is, they run in even-numbered, but not presidential election, years, RCW 36.16.010). Thus,
our results are not driven by mayors or district attorneys responding to their own political
cycles.
In Washington, the governor and the attorney general do run on the same electoral cycle as
judges. However, we can exploit differences in the timing of political pressure across offices to
isolate the impact of the judicial political cycle. Specifically, many judges in our sample face
only a threat of competition; their political cycle effectively ends in late July, the deadline
for a competitor to file to run in an upcoming election. On the other hand, gubernatorial
and attorney general candidates always (in the years considered) face actual competition
through the November general election.
To distinguish between the political pressure associated with judges and that associated
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with the governor or attorney general, we estimate equation (1) using quarters to the next
filing deadline as our measure of electoral proximity. Importantly, we estimate this model
using only those judges who are not challenged. For these judges, we expect much harsher
sentencing, and more upward deviations, just before (and through) July of an election year,
and much more lenient sentencing just afterward. On the other hand, if our findings were
driven by the governor’s or the attorney general’s political cycle, we would expect a sharp
decline in the severity of sentencing in the beginning of November, rather than in the end
of July. In terms of the quarters to the next filing deadline dummy variables we use, judges’
cycles imply large, positive coefficients when there are few quarters remaining before the
filing date (relative to the omitted 16-quarters dummy). If the other political cycles matter,
16-quarters to the filing date should still be associated with severe sentences: this quarter
covers August, September, and October, just before the attorney general’s and gubernatorial
general election, so 1- or 2-quarters to the filing date should be insignificantly different
from zero (when 16-quarters-to-filing date is the omitted category). Indeed, we find a large,
statistically significant break in sentence length at the end of July – this cannot be attributed
to any election cycle other than the judges’ (see Figure 3).39
5.3.3 Falsification Exercises
If the sentencing cycles we observed above were the result of some factor other than political
pressure on judges – for instance, unobservable case characteristics changing in a manner
correlated with judges’ political cycles – one might expect to see sentencing cycles even
for judges who are not running for re-election. To test for cycles among judges not facing
political pressure, we next estimate equation (1) only using cases sentenced by judges who
are retiring at the end of their term.40 We present results in Table 4, column 3. In fact, we
do not find evidence of sentencing cycles among judges who are in their final terms. The
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estimated effect of greater electoral proximity is small and is not statistically significant.
It is important to verify that the judges who retired in our sample did cycle when they
faced political pressure – one might think that the retiring judges in our sample were simply
different, and perhaps never “cycled.” We thus estimate equation (1) for the judges who
retire in our sample, but during terms when they faced elections, and find that these “retiring
judges” did exhibit sentencing cycles when they faced political pressure (see Table 4, column
4).41
Another check of the theory that political pressure affects sentencing involves consideration
of crimes, the sentencing of which might be less salient or important to voters. Finding large
cycles even for these less visible crimes might suggest that something other than political
pressure is driving our results. Thus, we estimate equation (1) only using less-visible crimes.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we do not find significant sentencing cycles for the crimes
that are not visible (see Table 4, column 5, and compare with the baseline results for visible
crimes re-produced in Table 4, column 6).42
As a final falsification exercise, we examine felony sentencing in the State of Oregon and test
whether Oregon sentencing exhibits cycles that coincide with Washington judicial elections,
even though Oregon’s judicial election cycles do not generally overlap with Washington’s
(Oregon judges are elected every six years, see Oregon Constitution Art. VII). We obtained
data from the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission (described in the Online Appendix,
Table A3) and estimated a model similar to equation (1) using sentence length in months as
the outcome variable and linear distance as the explanatory variable of interest. We find no
evidence of sentencing cycles in Oregon corresponding to the Washington electoral cycle (see
Table 4, column 7). This is not a result of the slightly different specification used: running
the same specification on our Washington data yields large and significant cycles (see Table
4, column 8).
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These results strongly support the hypothesis that judges’ behavior changes as they face
greater political pressure near the end of their political cycles. To better understand this
shift in judges’ behavior, we now examine sentencing in more detail, focusing in particular
on the role of deviations outside of Washington’s sentencing guidelines in generating the
sentencing cycles we have identified.
5.4 Upward Deviations Outside the Guidelines Range
Judges in Washington, prior to the Blakely decision, could exercise their discretion to impose
more severe sentences along two dimensions. First, they could impose longer sentences
within the cell of the guidelines range that applied to a given case. Second, they could
find aggravating factors that would allow them to deviate outside the cell of the sentencing
guidelines grid. Since Blakely, judges have still been able to deviate above the high-end
of the guidelines cell, but the special factors must be found by the jury or pled to by the
defendant.43 Here we examine whether judges exercise their discretion to sentence above the
guidelines range more often as their elections approach.
We estimate equation (1) for visible crimes, using linear distance as a measure of electoral
proximity, and using as our outcome variable a dummy variable equal to 1 if the imposed
sentence exceeds the high-end of the guidelines range.44 Using our baseline specification,
we find that, indeed, judges deviate above the guidelines range more often closer to their
elections (see Table 5, column 1). The effect of electoral proximity is both statistically and
economically significant: moving from the beginning of a judge’s political cycle to the end
is estimated to increase the probability of an upward deviation by 3 percentage points, over
half of the average probability of an upward deviation for visible crimes.
As we did above, we present a variety of robustness checks of our baseline estimates. In
28
Table 5, columns 2–8, we present robustness checks analogous to those presented in Table
3, columns 2–8. Again we find that our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of post-
Blakely cases, of murder cases, or of trials; the use of a linear distance measure based only on
filing deadlines; the construction and inclusion of guideline cells; or, the use of the 1985–2006
dataset discussed above.45 In addition to these specification checks, we estimate equation (1)
as a probit rather than as a linear probability model (see Table 5, column 9). In the Online
Appendix, we show that the upward deviations are not driven by other elected officials’
political cycles, using a non-linear electoral proximity measure (see the Online Appendix,
Table A7, column 2); we also show that upward deviations among trials follow the same
pattern as for other cases (see the Online Appendix, Table A11). We consistently find that
upward deviations are more likely at the end of the political cycle than at the beginning,
and the magnitude of our estimates suggests that deviation outside the guidelines range is
an important aspect of judges’ use of their discretion in response to political pressure.46
Determining whether deviations above the range explain a large fraction of the difference
in sentence length across the political cycle is important for at least two reasons. First,
the ability of a judge to deviate above the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines
is granted by legislatures to allow judges to tailor sentences to fit unusual offenses that
deserve unusually severe punishment.47 One’s views (and especially those of legislators) on
the desirable range of judicial discretion might be affected if one thought that it were used
in response to political pressure, rather than to the circumstances of an offense. Note that
we cannot say whether judges’ greater use of discretion toward the end of the political cycle
is harmful or beneficial to social welfare. That is, judges might be sentencing optimally
toward the end of political cycles (when sentences are longer and upward deviations more
common), or toward the beginning. Regardless, one would likely prefer judicial discretion to
be used consistently in response to the facts of a case, rather than to the timing of a case’s
sentencing.
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Second, the Blakely decision affected judges’ abilities to deviate above the sentencing guide-
lines range differently in different states. In Washington, judges can no longer find aggra-
vating circumstances to deviate above the guidelines range. Thus, upward deviations have
become much less a matter of judicial discretion, constraining the ability of a judge to im-
pose different sentences across the political cycle. If upward deviations were responsible for
a large fraction of the sentencing differences found above, one might expect more muted
politically-driven sentencing cycles in the post-Blakely period.
To determine the importance of upward deviations to the findings above, we estimate equa-
tion (1) using our baseline specification (as in Table 3, column 1). Now, however, we use as
our outcome variable the sentence length in months censored at the high-end (and at the
low-end) of the guidelines range. As above, sentence lengths are top-coded at 720 months.
This can loosely be thought of as a counterfactual in which judges were forced to impose
the high-end of the guidelines range whenever they wanted to deviate from it.48 Using this
censored outcome variable, we find that the estimated coefficient on linear distance is very
small for all cases, and for pleas alone (see Table 6).49 This suggests that a large fraction
of the sentencing cycles found above was the result of out-of-range sentences, rather than
more severe sentences within the range. It will be interesting to examine data from the
post-Blakely period, as it becomes available, to determine whether the pattern of upward
deviations has changed and whether sentencing cycles have diminished in magnitude or are
now more pronounced along the within-range margin.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a multi-layered analysis of the impact of judicial elections
on sentencing in Washington Superior Courts. We estimate that the difference in sentence
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length between the beginning and the end of a judge’s political cycle is around 10% of the
average sentence for serious crimes on the person. Importantly, we were able to provide sug-
gestive evidence that judges’ sentencing, rather than changes in attorneys’ bargains, accounts
for this pattern; we distinguish between judicial political cycles and the political cycles of
other officials; and, we rule out competing hypotheses, such as changing case characteristics,
by conducting several falsification exercises. We show that judges’ deviations outside the
sentencing guidelines range account for a large part of the sentencing cycles we find, suggest-
ing that constraining judicial discretion could affect judges’ response to political pressure.
We contribute to the existing literature on the consequences of judicial elections a detailed
examination of the channels through which judicial elections affect sentencing. The evidence
we present points to the importance of judges’ behavioral responses to political pressure –
and specifically their use of discretion to go beyond sentencing guidelines ranges.
These results inform the debate on whether judges should be elected or appointed: we present
evidence that the most commonly used method to retain judges – nonpartisan elections –
generates different sentences for very similar crimes across a judge’s political cycle. The
results also highlight a potentially important interaction between the degree of discretion
allowed to judges and the influence of politics on their behavior. We cannot say whether
social welfare would increase or decrease if judges were appointed or if judicial discretion
were more constrained (though our results imply a major violation of horizontal equity), but
we can quite definitively say that sentencing patterns would differ, and that the variation
in sentencing solely due to political pressure would be diminished. More generally, these
results contribute to the large, but unsettled, literature on the effects of elections on public
servants’ behavior.
Our results suggest several avenues for future work. Most basically, examining sentencing in
other states and across longer time periods would test the generality of our findings. Further
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work should also consider the interaction between constraints on judicial discretion and the
effects of political pressure: variation exists both across states and over time in judges’ ability
to deviate above guidelines ranges, and whether political cycles are muted when judges face
tighter constraints is an open question. It is also important to study whether sentencing
cycles disproportionately affect specific classes of individuals or are associated with specific
classes of judges. Examination of the latter might shed light on how effectively judges’
sentencing cycles deter the entry of competitors.
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Notes
1The Federalist Papers 78 and 79 address this issue in justifying lifetime appointment for
U.S. Federal judges in the U.S. Constitution. While U.S. Federal judges are appointed for
life, well over half of U.S. states utilize judicial elections for some judges (39 states, according
to the Brennan Center at NYU School of Law, as of September 2010).
2See, for example, Besley and Payne (2005); Lim (2008); Pozen (2008); and Liptak (2008).
3O’Connor (2010) argues in a New York Times op-ed against the election of judges;
examples of organizations critical of judicial elections include Justice at Stake Campaign
(http://www.justiceatstake.org), the Elmo B. Hunter Citizens Center for Judicial Selec-
tion (http://www.ajs.org/selection/index.asp), and the Illinois Campaign for Political
Reform (http://www.ilcampaign.org). DeBow et al. (2002) and Bonneau and Hall (2009),
on the other hand, argue in favor of judicial elections.
4Lim (2008) and Gordon and Huber (2004) and (2007), discussed below, examine judicial
elections. Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007 and 2008) and Cross and Tiller (1998) study
judges’ sentencing under courts of appeals with differing political compositions; Freeborn
and Hartmann (2010) study judges constrained by sentencing policy; and Posner (2005)
writes more generally on judicial behavior.
5Theoretical studies include Barro (1973), Nordhaus (1975), Besley and Coate (2003),
Maskin and Tirole (2004), and Alesina and Tabellini (2007 and 2008). Empirical work
outside the realm of the judicial branch includes Besley and Case (1995) and Dal Bo´ and
Rossi (2009).
6Besley and Payne (2005) acknowledge this and attempt to resolve it by using the method
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states use to select public utility regulators as an instrument for the methods used to select
judges. Of course, the method used to select regulators could be correlated with institutional,
economic, or political factors that affect judicial behavior.
7In our sample period, there were 30 judicial districts until 1999, when Chelan and Dou-
glas counties split into two judicial districts.
8Interim vacancies are filled via gubernatorial appointments and, in general, special elec-
tions are held for such seats in the yearly election following the appointment (RCW 2.08.120).
Judges run again in the next presidential election year.
9RCW 9.94A.310(1). For a discussion of the Sentencing Reform Act and the effects of the
Blakely decision (discussed below), see Nussbaum (2005). Please see the Online Appendix,
Figure A1, for the Sentencing Guidelines Grid from the year 2000; the Online Appendix,
Figure A2, for a form indicating the mapping from a conviction offense and criminal history
into a guidelines cell; and, the Online Appendix, Figure A3, for the form determining the
deadly weapon enhancement.
10Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007) and (2008) find manipulation of the guidelines cells
under the far more intricate Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
11Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
12For instance, Kuziemko (2007) finds that parole boards in Georgia assign longer terms
to those inmates with higher ex-ante recidivism risk.
13Linear discounting will generate a linear relationship between an election’s proximity and
an official’s behavior, while non-linear (e.g., βδ) discounting will produce greater behavioral
adjustment closer to the election.
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14General Social Surveys, 1972–2006 [Cumulative File]: Courts Dealing with Criminals –
(90) (available at http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/Data+Analysis).
15Although the GSS is a national survey (and we are not aware of a similar survey con-
ducted solely in Washington), survey responses from the Pacific region are nearly identical
to those for the nation as a whole. Survey results for the period we study (1995–2006) are
also extremely similar to those cited in the text.
16For the gubernatorial primaries, 32,227 votes were cast in Yakima County, compared to
72,188 in the general election.
17For the gubernatorial primaries, 374,784 votes were cast in King County, compared to
874,928 in the general election.
18The Washington newspapers included in the searches discussed in this section are the
Seattle Times, the Seattle Post Intelligencer, The Columbian (Vancouver) and The News
Tribune (Tacoma).
19For a discussion of some of the potential methodological issues that may arise with the
use of electronic searches on newspapers see Glaeser and Goldin (2004) and Gentzkow et al.
(2004).
20To search for stories relating to Superior Court judges and city council members we use
the following search strings: [“Superior Court” w/5 Judge] and [(Councilman or council-
woman or councilperson or “council member”) and “City Council”], respectively.
21To search for stories relating to Superior Court judges and sentencing we use [“Superior
Court” w/5 judge and sentenc!] as our search string.
22To search for such stories we use the following search string: [(“Superior Court” w/5
40
judge) and sentenc! and (murder or homicide or manslaughter or robbery or assault or
rape)]. Roberts and Doob (1990) also find that violent crimes on the person (rape, robbery,
assault) are most often reported in the media.
23The Washington Judicial Voter Pamphlet was first published in 1996. In it, a candidate
can provide a brief biography and state why voters should select the candidate.
24For sentences dated before July 1, 1999, our dataset lacks the specific day of the sentence.
We have dated these sentences as having occurred on the 15th of the sentence month.
25All of these regressions are available upon request. They are omitted for brevity.
26In all calculations of statistical significance, standard errors are clustered at the quarter-
of-the-year level (for example, January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2004). Clustering at the judge
or county level does not change our inferences, nor does clustering at the level of the election
cycle.
27The coefficient estimates on variables other than linear distance are presented in the
Online Appendix, Table A5. These estimates are consistent with results from the literature:
black defendants receive longer sentences, women shorter sentences, older defendants longer
sentences, and defendants with prior convictions longer sentences, ceteris paribus.
28To some extent this problem is alleviated by our decision to top-code sentences at 720
months (below we consider raising the top-code to 1,200 months). Including murder cases
involves other potential complications; for example, unobservables may play an unusually
important role in murder sentences.
29If we estimate our baseline specification on trials alone, our point estimate is qualitatively
similar to that on the entire sample: sentences are around 10% longer at the end of the cycle
than at the beginning. Because there are relatively few trials in our sample (one-eighth the
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number of pleas), the estimate is not very precise and thus not quite statistically significant:
the p-value of the coefficient estimate on linear distance is 0.177. See the Online Appendix,
Table A6, column 1.
30While we focus on results using our standard linear distance measure throughout the
paper, all of our estimates are robust to using the purely exogenous linear distance measure.
31To check whether our results are sensitive to this method of grouping, we instead group
the crimes in cells with fewer than 100 cases, 100 at a time, and 200 cases, 200 at a time.
We also construct cells based solely on the seriousness of the conviction offense and the de-
fendant’s criminal background. These constructed cells do not perfectly map onto the actual
cells for all crimes because weapons enhancements, attempts, and other factors determine
the low- and high-end for a given crime, along with the conviction offense and the criminal
history. Finally, we estimate the model using all cells without grouping. The results are
unaffected using these cell constructs.
32See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for a brief description of the dataset.
33See the Online Appendix, Table A6, column 2, for results from the 1995–2006 period
using the rougher, 1985-2006 dataset’s data for this period. These estimates confirm the
results from Table 3, column 1, using the alternative dataset. Note also that our results are
robust to dropping the four years around each of the individual elections in our sample.
34We have estimated the “plus 1” specification including as a control an indicator that the
sentence was of length 0, and this does not affect our results.
35To be precise, we include the interaction between a “trial” dummy variable and linear
distance, as well as the “trial” dummy alone (and we omit the “plea” dummy). The coeffi-
cient on the interaction of linear distance with “trial” plus the coefficient on linear distance
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captures the impact of elections on sentencing for trials. We do not report the latter in the
paper, but it is statistically significant and large.
36We have also estimated a model allowing pleas to differentially affect sentencing in the
last 6 months of a judge’s political cycle, and again find an estimated coefficient on linear
distance similar to the “only pleas” specification (results available upon request).
37In the Online Appendix, Table A10, we present these regression estimates.
38Dyke (2007) finds that District Attorneys prosecute more cases during their election
years.
39Regression coefficients and standard errors are reported in the Online Appendix, Table
A7, column 1.
40To be precise, we estimate equation (1) for judges who both face electoral pressure and
retire in our sample, using cases sentenced in their final terms.
41One might also be concerned that retiring judges heard very different cases in their final
terms. In the Online Appendix, Table A8, we present summary statistics for serious crime
cases heard by these judges during terms when facing elections and terms when not facing
elections. While there are some differences across terms, the fraction of defendants who
are black, the fraction with prior convictions, and the average low-end and high-end of the
sentencing guidelines range are all quite similar.
42In results omitted for brevity, we estimate equation (1) using all crimes and include an
interaction between a “visible crime indicator” and our linear electoral proximity measure.
We find that the coefficient on electoral proximity alone (which applies to less-visible crimes)
is not significant, while the interaction between the visible crime indicator and electoral prox-
imity is significantly different from zero. These results are available in the Online Appendix,
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Table A9.
43Judges can also deviate below the low-end of the guidelines cell that applied to a given
case (see Engen et al., 2003). The circumstances under which judges can do so are relatively
complicated, and deviations below the range therefore require careful study, which we leave
to other work.
44We use only those crimes for which the high-end of the guidelines range is less than 1,200
months in order to consider only those cases for which upward deviations are possible given
our highest top-code for sentence length of 1,200 months. Using the 720 months top-code
does not change the results.
45Our test for cyclicality of upward deviations is robust to all of the other specifications
considered in our test for cyclicality of sentence length.
46We also examine whether the magnitude of upward deviation outside the guidelines range
differs over the political cycle, conditional on a sentence being above the guidelines range.
Specifically, we estimate equation (1) using the difference between a case’s sentence and the
high-end of the guidelines range as the outcome variable. We find suggestive evidence that
deviations actually get larger toward the end of the political cycle and certainly do not offset
the increased probability of upward deviations.
47See, for example, Shavell (2007) for a theoretical discussion of the optimal degree of
discretion that should be granted to judges. Legislatures may also grant judges discretion
simply because judges prefer to have discretion (see Boylan (2004) and Posner (1993)).
48This constraint could affect sentencing decisions for cases other than those that result
in upward deviations, but we believe that the exercise is still informative regarding the
importance of upward deviations to our findings.
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49Results for trials alone are very similar. See the Online Appendix, Table A12.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Defendant Gender (female=1) 18447 0.079 0.27
Black Defendant 18447 0.242 0.428
Hispanic Defendant 18447 0.068 0.251
Asian Defendant 18447 0.039 0.193
Native American Defendant 18447 0.03 0.169
Age of Defendant (years) 18447 29.392 10.145
Any Prior Convictions 18447 0.527 0.499
3+ Priors 18447 0.275 0.447
Adjudicated via Plea 18447 0.886 0.317
Visible Crime, Excluding Murder 18447 0.904 0.295
Sentence Length (in months, capped at 720) 18447 67.166 120.118
Upward Deviation 18447 0.063 0.243
Linear Distance to Election 18447 0.506 0.293
Low-end of Guidelines Range 18447 50.943 79.873
High-end of Guidelines Range 18447 67.626 101.628
Table 1: Case-level Summary Statistics, Visible Crimes
Note: See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on the construction of the 
variables above.
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p
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ct
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!
Table 6: Using Censored Sentence Lengths 
 (1) (2) 
 All Cases Pleas Only 
linear distance -0.485 0.0101 
 [0.255]* [0.323] 
Observations 18447 16,353 
R-squared 0.98 0.98 
Mean censored sentence length 59.68 47.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome variable is 
the sentence length in months, capped at 720, and censored at the high- and low-end of 
the guidelines range. The explanatory variable of interest, linear distance, is a linear 
measure of distance to the next election. Both regressions include year fixed effects, 
quarter fixed effects, a post-Blakely dummy variable, time variant district controls 
(unemployment rate, crime rate, and violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a 
gender dummy, race dummies, a dummy for prior convictions, and a dummy for 3 or 
more priors), offense fixed effects, a set of judicial district fixed effects, a set of judge 
fixed effects, and a set of guidelines cell fixed effects. Column 1 includes a dummy 
indicating whether the case was resolved via plea agreement. Please refer to the Online 
Appendix, Table A3, for information on variable construction. 
!
Note: Graph shows the average difference (for serious, visible crimes) between sentence length in months 
(capped at 720) and the high-end of the sentencing guidelines range, by the number of quarters remaining 
until the end of a judge’s political cycle (either the filing deadline for competitors or the election date). 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Defendant Gender (female=1) 276119 0.187 0.39
Black Defendant 276119 0.145 0.352
Hispanic Defendant 276119 0.059 0.236
Asian Defendant 276119 0.021 0.142
Native American Defendant 276119 0.023 0.149
Age of Defendant (years) 276119 31.517 9.61
Any Prior Convictions 276119 0.602 0.49
3+ Priors 276119 0.324 0.468
Adjudicated via Plea 276119 0.951 0.215
Visible Crime, Excluding Murder 276119 0.06 0.238
Visible Crime 276119 0.067 0.25
Sentence Length (in months, capped at 720) 276119 15.053 42.319
Upward Deviation 276119 0.026 0.159
Linear Distance to Election 276119 0.508 0.29
Low-end of Guidelines Range 276119 12.967 30.121
High-end of Guidelines Range 276119 20.189 38.169
Table A1: Case-level Summary Statistics, All Crimes
Note: See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on the construction of 
the variables above.
Online Appendix
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Date of Initial Election/Appointment 265 1992.857 7.6596
Final Year as Superior Court Judge 265 2005.317 4.2146
Judge Gender (female=1) 265 0.2906 0.4549
Black Judge 265 0.0528 0.2241
Hispanic Judge 265 0.0189 0.1363
Asian Judge 265 0.0302 0.1714
Washington Bar Admissions Date 265 1974.589 8.6305
Public Defender Experience 265 0.0755 0.2647
Prosecutorial Experience 265 0.3585 0.4805
Judicial Experience 265 0.4604 0.4994
Retires in Sample 265 0.2151 0.4117
Table A2: Judge-level Summary Statistics
Note: See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on the construction 
of the variables above.
2
Table A3: Data Description 
1. Main Dataset 
Electoral Proximity Measures 
Source: Washington Secretary of State and county auditors websites.  
lindist  In general, lindist is equal to the number of days between the date of sentence 
and the next election's filing deadline, divided by 1461. For judges facing 
competition, lindist equals 0 between the filing date and the judge's last 
competitive election in that election cycle.  
quartertoelect  Set of dummyvariables indicatingthe number of quarters remaining until a 
judge’s upcoming filing deadline (these indicators were constructed based on 
lindist).  
Defendant Level Controls 
Source: Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission.  
defrace  Set of dummy variables indicating the race of the defendant (Black, Hispanic, 
Asian, Native American).  
defgender  Equals 1 if defendant is female. 
agedef1  Age of defendant at sentencing (missing entries are imputed average defendant 
age in sample).  
priorconv  Equals 1 if defendant has at least one prior conviction.  
priorconv3  Equals 1 if defendant has at least three prior convictions.  
Judge Level Controls 
Source: Unless otherwise noted, data are from newspaper articles and official press releases.  
judgename  Name of sentencing judge.(Source: Washington Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission.)  
judgegender  Equals 1 if judge is female. 
Judgerace  Set of dummyvariables indicatingthe race of the judge (White, Black, Hispanic, 
Asian). (Source: American Bar Association Directory of Minority Judges and 
Loren Miller Bar Association Directory).  
prosecutor  Equals 1 if judge had prosecutorial experience before initial appointment or 
election to the Superior Court.  
timefrombar  Equals number of years between the sentence and the year of the judge’s 
admission to the Washington bar. (Source: Washington State Bar Association.)  
retire Equals 1 if judge both faces electoral pressure and retires in our sample.  
Case Level Controls 
Source: Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission.  
pleaadj  Equals 1 if case was adjudicated in a plea agreement. 
offensecode  FourͲdigit category of the conviction offense. 
crimeclass  TwoͲdigit category of the conviction offense. 
visible  Equals 1 if conviction offense is Murderor Manslaughter (all classes), Assault 
(1
st
and 2
nd
degrees), Rape (1
st
and 2
nd
degrees) or Robbery (1
st
and 2
nd
degrees).  
visible_nm  Equals 1 if conviction offense is Assault (1
st
and 2
nd
degrees), Rape (1
st
and 
2
nd
degrees) or Robbery (1
st
and 2
nd
degrees).  
sentencedateyear  Year of sentence. 
naturalquarter  Quarter of the year in which sentence is imposed (1Q: JanͲMar, 2Q: AprͲJun,
3Q: JulͲSep, 4Q: OctͲDec).
postblakely  Equal to 1 if the date of sentence is after June 24, 2004.  
3
Table A3: Data Description (continued) 
Sentencing Guidelines Controls 
Source: Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission.  
lowrange720  Equals the minimum sentence in the range capped at 720; equals 720for life 
sentences.  
highrange720  Equals the maximum sentence in the range capped at 720; equals 720for life and 
death sentences.  
lowrange1200  Equals the minimum sentence in the rangecapped at 1200; equals 1200 for life 
sentences.  
highrange1200  Equals the maximum sentence in the range capped at 1200; equals 1200 for life 
and death sentences.  
gridcell150  Set of indicator variables representing groups based on lowͲ and highͲend of 
therange of each observation. Observations belonging to cells with fewer than 
150 cases are grouped 150 at a time based on similarity of the lowͲend of the 
range. (Note: gridcell150 is constructed separately for each sentence topcode.)
gridcell100  Set of indicator variables representing groups based on lowͲ and highͲend of the 
range of each observation. Observations belonging to cells with fewer than 100 
cases are grouped 100 at a time based on similarity of the lowͲend of the range. 
(Note: gridcell100 is constructed separately for each sentence topcode.)
gridcell200  Set of indicator variables representing groups based on lowͲ and highͲend of the 
range of each observation. Observations belonging to cells with fewer than 200 
cases are grouped 200 at a time based on similarity of the lowͲend of the range. 
(Note: gridcell200 is constructed separately for each sentence topcode.)
gridcell50  Set of indicator variables representing groups based on lowͲ and highͲend of the 
range of each observation. Observations belonging to cells with fewer than 50 
cases are coded as missing values. (Note: gridcell50 is constructed separately 
for each sentence topcode.)
District Level Controls 
Source: Unless otherwise noted, data is from the 2000 U.S. Census.  
judicialdistrict  Set of dummy variables indicating the judicial district in which the case was 
heard.
county  Set of dummy variables indicating the county in which the case was heard. 
crimerate  Number of crimes (Murder, Rape, Robbery, Assault, Burglary, Larceny, 
MotorͲvehicle Theft, and Arson) reported per 100,000 people. For sentences 
rendered prior to 2002, we calculate crime rate using data from 1996; for 
sentences rendered after 2002 (inclusive) we calculate crime rate using data 
from 2002. (Source: FBI UCR datasets.)  
violcrimerate  Number of serious crimes (Murder, Rape, Assault) reported per 100,000 people. 
For sentences rendered prior to 2002, we calculate serious crime rate using data 
from 1996; for sentences rendered after 2002 (inclusive) we calculate serious 
crime rate using data from 2002. (Source: FBI UCR datasets.)  
unemp  Unemployment rate (by districtͲyear). (Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.) 
2. Extended Dataset 
This dataset required no linking to election records, etc. We simply took the raw data provided by the SGC, dropped a small number
of duplicates, assigned each case a linear electoral proximity measure based on the upcoming election's filing date, capped sentences 
at 720 months, rounded sentences to the nearest whole number when sentences were within 0.05 months of a whole number, and 
generated guidelines cells based on the low- and high-end assigned for each case (dropping cases in cells with fewer than 50 
observations). 
3. Oregon Dataset 
Our Oregon dataset contains 16,990 visible cases for the period July 1995 through December 2006. We cap the sentence length in 
months at 720 and add our standard linear distance electoral proximity measure (of course, calibrated to the Washington election
cycle).
4
Before Election After Election Before = After
Variable Mean Mean P-value
Gender (female=1) 0.187 0.186 0.801
Black Defendant 0.154 0.152 0.544
Hispanic Defendant 0.06 0.066 0.001
Age of Defendant (years) 31.369 31.414 0.527
Any Prior Convictions 0.593 0.598 0.17
3+ Priors 0.319 0.32 0.784
Adjudicated via Plea 0.95 0.952 0.126
Visible Crime, Excluding Murder 0.062 0.063 0.895
Visible Crime 0.069 0.069 0.907
Linear Distance to Election 0.062 0.937 0
Low-end of Guidelines Range 13.046 13.188 0.54
High-end of Guidelines Range 20.248 20.515 0.362
Observations 36489 34211
Table A4: Case Characteristics Just Before and Just After Elections, 
All Crimes
Note: The period just before the election is defined as the period with 2- or 1-quarter to the 
next election (or filing date, depending on whether the judge faced competition); the period 
just after the election is defined as 16- or 15-quarters to the next election.  P-values come from 
a two-tailed test that the mean just before the election equals the mean just after the election. 
See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on the construction of the variables 
above.
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(1)
lindist -6.802
[2.209]***
Crimerate 0.108
[0.166]
Female defendant -5.054
[1.249]***
Black defendant 2.095
[1.159]*
Hispanic defendant -0.545
[1.647]
Age of defendant 0.499
[0.0635]***
Any prior convictions dummy 7.058
[1.322]***
Case adjudicated via plea -33.69
[4.605]***
Constant 357
[51.09]***
Observations 18,447
R-squared 0.73
Table A5: Baseline Estimates, Coefficients on Controls
Notes: This is the same regression as reported in Table 3, column 1. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome variable is the 
sentence length in months, capped at 720. The explanatory variable of 
interest, lindist, is a linear measure of distance to the next election. Regression 
includes year fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, a post-Blakely  dummy 
variable, time variant district controls (unemployment rate, crime rate, and 
violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, 
a dummy for prior convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense 
fixed effects, a dummy indicating whether the case was resolved via plea 
agreement, a set of judicial district fixed effects, a set of judge fixed effects, 
and a set of guidelines cell fixed effects. Please refer to Online Appendix, 
Table A3, for information on variable construction.
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(1) (2)
Quarter-until-filing-date dummy Sentence in Months Upward Deviations
1 8.98 0.033
[2.602]*** [0.017]*
2 8.702 0.045
[3.534]** [0.016]***
3 4.994 0.029
[3.370] [0.015]*
4 3.116 0.036
[3.473] [0.017]**
5 2.713 0.028
[3.842] [0.019]
6 2.766 0.037
[3.917] [0.022]*
7 -0.858 0.021
[4.553] [0.020]
8 -4.022 0.011
[4.431] [0.019]
9 -3.458 0.008
[4.183] [0.020]
10 -2.103 0.022
[4.402] [0.020]
11 -1.912 0.011
[4.214] [0.017]
12 2.233 0.031
[4.100] [0.016]*
13 1.006 0.025
[3.896] [0.017]
14 1.557 0.016
[3.978] [0.015]
15 0.88 0.004
[3.873] [0.011]
Observations 17261 17277
R-squared 0.73 0.09
Mean outcome 67.69 0.06
Table A7: Judges Without Challengers: Sentence Length and Deviations
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%). The outcome variable in columns 1 and 2 is the sentence length in months, capped at 720. The outcome 
variable in columns 3 and 4 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the sentence imposed in case i  exceeds the high-end of the 
guidelines range for case i . The explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating the number of quarters 
remaining before the upcoming filing deadline (16 quarters to the deadline is the omitted dummy variable). Both regressions 
include year fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, a post-Blakely dummy variable, time variant district controls (unemployment 
rate, crime rate, and violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, a dummy for prior 
convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense fixed effects, a dummy indicating whether the case was resolved via 
plea agreement, a set of judicial district fixed effects, a set of judge fixed effects, and a set of guidelines cell fixed effects. 
Please refer to the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on variable construction.
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Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean
Gender (female=1) 1694 0.087 1499 0.066
Black Defendant 1694 0.27 1499 0.264
Hispanic Defendant 1694 0.058 1499 0.068
Table A8: Defendant and Case Characteristics for Retiring Judges
Term Before Retirement Terms Facing Election
Asian Defendant 1694 0.044 1499 0.044
Native American Defendant 1694 0.031 1499 0.037
Age of Defendant (years) 1694 29.485 1499 28.398
Any Prior Convictions 1694 0.543 1499 0.519
3+ Priors 1694 0.29 1499 0.254
Adjudicated via Plea 1694 0.87 1499 0.855
Visible Crime, Excluding Murder 1694 0.919 1499 0.891
Sentence Length (in months, capped at 720) 1694 68.24 1499 72.415
Upward Deviation 1694 0.055 1499 0.067
Linear Distance to Election 1694 0.557 1499 0.406
Low-end of Guidelines Range 1694 50.468 1499 52.551
High-end of Guidelines Range 1694 66.485 1499 69.116
Note: Table includes serious, visible cases heard by judges who both retire and face electoral pressure 
in the sample, in their final terms (“Term Before Retirement”) and in previous terms (“Terms Facing 
Election”). See the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on the construction of the variables 
above.
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(1)
All Visible Crimes
Visible dummy 15.57
[1.678]***
lindist -0.192
[0.225]
lindist*Visible -4.89
[2.188]**
Observations 276119
R-squared 0.72
Mean sentence length 15.05
Table A9: Sentencing Cycles for Visible and Less-Visible Crimes
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome variable is the sentence length in months, 
capped at 720. The explanatory variables of interest are a visible crimes dummy variable (equal to 1 
if case i  involved a visible crime), lindist (a linear measure of distance to the next election), and the 
interaction between the visible crimes dummy and lindist. Regression includes year fixed effects, 
quarter fixed effects, a post-Blakely  dummy variable, time variant district controls (unemployment 
rate, crime rate, and violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, a 
dummy for prior convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense fixed effects, a dummy 
indicating whether the case was resolved via plea agreement, a set of judicial district fixed effects, a 
set of judge fixed effects, and a set of guidelines cell fixed effects. Please refer to the Online 
Appendix, Table A3, for information on variable construction.
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Quarter-until-election dummy (1)
1 6.643
[2.652]**
2 7.519
[3.899]*
Table A10: Non-linear Estimates: Sentence Length
3 3.847
[3.649]
4 2.237
[3.624]
5 1.956
[4.014]
6 1.554
[4.108]
7 -1.962
[4.692]
8 -4.773
[4.558]
9 4 8- .5 7
[4.242]
10 -3.367
[4.522]
11 -2.378
[4.408]
12 1 199.
[4.271]
13 0.299
[3.963]
14 0.286
[4.007]
15 0 022.
[3.870]
Observations 18447
R-squared 0.73
Mean outcome 67.17
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) The outcome variable is the sentence length      .      
in months, capped at 720. The explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating 
the number of quarters remaining before the upcoming filing deadline (16 quarters to the 
deadline is the omitted dummy variable). Regression includes year fixed effects, quarter fixed 
effects, a post-Blakely  dummy variable, time variant district controls (unemployment rate, 
crime rate, and violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, a 
dummy for prior convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense fixed effects, a 
dummy indicating whether the case was resolved via plea agreement, a set of judicial district
fixed effects, a set of judge fixed effects, and a set of guidelines cell fixed effects. Please refer 
to the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on variable construction.
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(1)
lindist -0.0660
(0.0514)
Observations 2,106
R-squared 0.296
Mean probability of upward deviation 0.163
Table A11: Sentencing Cycles: Upward Deviations for Trials Only
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome variable is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the sentence imposed in case i  exceeds the high-end of the guidelines range for 
case i . The explanatory variable of interest, lindist, is a linear measure of distance to the next 
election. Regression estimated using OLS for trials only and includes year fixed effects, quarter 
fixed effects, a post-Blakely  dummy variable, time variant district controls (unemployment rate, 
crime rate, and violent crime rate), defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, a 
dummy for prior convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense fixed effects, a set of 
judicial district fixed effects, a set of judge fixed effects, and a set of guidelines cell fixed 
effects. Please refer to the Online Appendix, Table A3, for information on variable construction.
12
(1)
Trials Only
lindist -2.927
(1.935)
Observations 2,094
Table A12: Using Censored Sentence Lengths
R-squared 0.980
Mean censored sentence length 156.70
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the quarter-year level, in brackets (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome 
variable is the sentence length in months, capped at 720, and censored at the 
high- and low-end of the guidelines range The explanatory variable of interest. ,
lindist, is a linear measure of distance to the next election. Regression includes 
year fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, a post-Blakely  dummy variable, time 
variant district controls (unemployment rate, crime rate, and violent crime rate), 
defendant controls (age, a gender dummy, race dummies, a dummy for prior 
convictions, and a dummy for 3 or more priors), offense fixed effects, a set of 
judicial district fixed effects, a set of judge fixed effects, and a set of guidelines
cell fixed effects. Please refer to the Online Appendix, Table A3, for 
information on variable construction.
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Adult Sentencing Manual 2006 III-40 
ASSAULT, FIRST DEGREE 
WITH A FINDING OF SEXUAL MOTIVATION 
(RCW 9A.36.011) 
CLASS A FELONY 
SERIOUS VIOLENT SEX 
I. OFFENDER SCORING (RCW 9.94A.525(16)) 
ADULT HISTORY: 
Enter number of sex offense convictions........................................................................................  _______ x 3 =  _______  
Enter number of other serious violent felony convictions ...............................................................  _______ x 3 =  _______  
Enter number of other violent felony convictions ............................................................................  _______ x 2 =  _______  
Enter number of other nonviolent felony convictions......................................................................  _______ x 1 =  _______  
JUVENILE HISTORY: 
Enter number of sex offense dispositions.......................................................................................  _______ x 3 =  _______  
Enter number of other serious violent felony dispositions ..............................................................  _______ x 3 =  _______  
Enter number of other violent felony dispositions ...........................................................................  _______ x 2 =  _______  
Enter number of other nonviolent felony dispositions.....................................................................  _______ x ½ =  _______  
OTHER CURRENT OFFENSES:  (Other current offenses which do not encompass the same conduct count in offender score) 
Enter number of other sex offense convictions...............................................................................  _______ x 3 =  _______  
Enter number of other violent felony convictions ............................................................................  _______ x 2 =  _______  
Enter number of other nonviolent felony convictions......................................................................  _______ x 1 =  _______  
STATUS:  Was the offender on community custody on the date the current offense was committed? (if yes),   + 1 =  _______  
Total the last column to get the Offender Score
(Round down to the nearest whole number) 
II.  SENTENCE RANGE 
A.  OFFENDER SCORE: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or more 
     STANDARD RANGE 
       (LEVEL XII) 
93 - 123 
months 
102 - 136 
months 
111 - 147
months 
120 - 160
months 
129 - 171
months 
138 - 184
months 
162 - 216 
months 
178 - 236 
months 
209 - 277
months
240 - 318
months
B. If the offender is not a persistent offender, then the minimum term for this offense* is the standard sentence range, and the maximum term 
is the statutory maximum for the offense.  See RCW 9.94A.712. 
C. When a court sentences a non-persistent offender to this offense, the court shall also sentence the offender to Community Custody under 
the supervision of the Dept. of Corrections and the authority of the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board for any period of time the person 
is released from total confinement before the expiration of the maximum sentence. See RCW 9.94A.712. 
D. If the court orders a deadly weapon enhancement, use the applicable enhancement sheets on pages III-7 or III-8 to calculate the enhanced 
sentence.
E. In the case of multiple prior convictions for offenses committed before July 1, 1986, please reference RCW 9.94A.525(12)(a)(ii) for 
purposes of computing the offender score. 
x*The offense must have been committed on or after September 1, 2001. 
x The scoring sheets are intended to provide assistance in most cases but do not cover all permutations of the scoring rules 
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Adult Sentencing Manual 2006 III-7 
GENERAL DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENT - FORM A 
Firearm or Other Deadly Weapon Enhancements*
1
For offenses committed after July 23, 1995 
Use of this form:  Only for offenses committed after July 23, 1995 that have a firearm or other deadly weapon finding. 
CLASS A FELONY DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENTS:
First Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense**:  Subsequent*** Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense: 
 Firearm 5 years Firearm 10 years 
 Other Deadly Weapon 2 years Other Deadly Weapon 4 years 
CLASS B FELONY DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENTS:   
First Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense**:  Subsequent*** Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense: 
 Firearm 3 years Firearm 6 years 
 Other Deadly Weapon 1 year Other Deadly Weapon 2 years 
CLASS C FELONY DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENTS:
First Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense**:  Subsequent*** Deadly Weapon/Firearm Offense: 
 Firearm 18 months Firearm 3 years 
 Other Deadly Weapon  6 months Other Deadly Weapon  1 year 
* Excluded offenses:  Possession of a Machine Gun, Possessing a Stolen Firearm, Drive-by Shooting, Theft of a Firearm, Unlawful
Possession of a Firearm 1 and 2, Use of a Machine Gun in a felony, or any offense committed on or before July 23, 1995 with a deadly
weapon finding. 
** This enhancement is limited to offenses committed after July 23, 1995. 
*** To be sentenced as a subsequent deadly weapon finding, the offense in history with a deadly weapon finding must also have been 
committed after July 23, 1995. 
STANDARD RANGE CALCULATION
 CURRENT OFFENSE
 BEING SCORED 
 SERIOUSNESSL
EVEL
 OFFENDERS
CORE
  BASE STANDARD SENTENCE 
RANGE
  TO
 LOW HIGH
DEADLY WEAPON ENHANCEMENT   
NOTE:  The "base standard 
sentence range" is the 
appropriate standard 
  
sentence without the deadly 
weapon enhancement. 
STANDARD RANGE TO
 LOW HIGH
1
For anticipatory offenses with a deadly weapon finding, add the enhancement after reducing the standard sentence range by 25%. 
Figure A3
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Statement on Plea of Guilty (Non-Sex Offense) (STTDFG) - Page 2 of 9
CrR 4.2(g) (8/2010)
 (d) The right at trial to testify and to have witnesses testify for me.  These witnesses can be 
made to appear at no expense to me; 
 (e) The right to be presumed innocent unless the State proves the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt or I enter a plea of guilty; 
 (f) The right to appeal a finding of guilt after a trial. 
6. In Considering the Consequences of my Guilty Plea, I Understand That:
(a) Each crime with which I am charged carries a maximum sentence, a fine, and a 
Standard Sentence Range as follows: 
COUNT NO. OFFENDER 
SCORE
STANDARD RANGE 
ACTUAL CONFINEMENT 
(not including enhancements) 
PLUS
Enhancements* 
COMMUNITY
CUSTODY
MAXIMUM TERM AND 
FINE
1      
2      
3      
* Each sentencing enhancement will run consecutively to all other parts of my entire sentence, including other enhancements 
and other counts.  The enhancement codes are:  (F) Firearm, (D) Other deadly weapon, (V) VUCSA in protected zone,  
(VH) Veh. Hom, see RCW 46.61.520, (JP) Juvenile present,  (CSG) Criminal street gang involving minor,
(AE) Endangerment while attempting to elude. 
 (b) The standard sentence range is based on the crime charged and my criminal history.  
Criminal history includes prior convictions and juvenile adjudications or convictions, 
whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere.
 (c) The prosecuting attorney's statement of my criminal history is attached to this agreement. 
Unless I have attached a different statement, I agree that the prosecuting attorney's statement 
is correct and complete.  If I have attached my own statement, I assert that it is correct and 
complete.  If I am convicted of any additional crimes between now and the time I am 
sentenced, I am obligated to tell the sentencing judge about those convictions. 
 (d) If I am convicted of any new crimes before sentencing, or if any additional criminal history 
is discovered, both the standard sentence range and the prosecuting attorney's 
recommendation may increase.  Even so, my plea of guilty to this charge is binding on me.  
I cannot change my mind if additional criminal history is discovered even though the 
standard sentencing range and the prosecuting attorney's recommendation increase or a 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is required by 
law.
 (e) In addition to sentencing me to confinement, the judge will order me to pay $500.00 as a 
victim's compensation fund assessment.  If this crime resulted in injury to any person or 
damage to or loss of property, the judge will order me to make restitution, unless 
extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution inappropriate.  The amount of 
restitution may be up to double my gain or double the victim’s loss.  The judge may also 
order that I pay a fine, court costs, attorney fees and the costs of incarceration.  
Figure A4
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